Book Chapters

Dayal and Howard. 2016. ''Peace Operations.'' In The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, edited by Jacob Katz Cogan, Ian Hurd, and Ian Johnstone. Oxford University Press.

Abstract
This chapter discusses peace operations' origins; their evolution alongside the growing international conflict management structures of the UN and other international organizations, and their core functions, composition, and efficacy. Although peace operations have roots in earlier forms of military intervention, their emergence as a dominant tool for conflict management is a distinct innovation of the same internationalist project that forged the UN.' Their evolution lays bare the fundamental tensions between state interests and the liberal internationalist project of a "world organization for the enforcement of peace:' and their execution has defined the way wars are fought today.' We focus on UN peace operations throughout because they are the modal type of mission in the world. The conclusion discusses the use of force within peace operations, an issue of growing importance that highlights fundamental tensions in the authorization and execution of internationally led efforts to maintain global peace and security. Taken together, these issues set in relief larger debates on cooperation between states, global integration, and the efficacy of intervention that characterize scholarship on international organizations.

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Howard. 2015. ''United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL).'' In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations, edited by Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, Paul D. Williams. Oxford University Press.

Abstract
The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established in May 1991, in the midst of fighting during the Salvadoran civil war, where there was “no peace to keep.” The UN was invited by both sides of the conflict - the Salvadoran government and the opposition, the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) - to monitor, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the human rights conditions in the country. In January 1992, the warring sides signed the Chapultepec Peace Accord, and ONUSAL expanded to an "active verification" mission, with civilian police, military, and eventually election monitoring divisions (but without changing its name or acronym). The mission was successful despite having started before there was a peace agreement to implement. Specialists on Central America have argued that, as of the mid-1990s, “of the UN's internal peacemaking efforts since the end of the Cold War, its work in El Salvador stands out as the most unambiguously successful.”

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Howard. 2015. ''United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia.'' In The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations, edited by Joachim A. Koops, Norrie MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, Paul D. Williams. Oxford University Press.

Abstract
The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed to Namibia from April 1989 until March 1990. It was the UN's first attempt at engaging in multidimensional peacekeeping after the demise of the Congo operation (ONUC) in 1964. UNTAG differed from many previous UN peacekeeping operations in that its primary means and purpose were political (in organizing free elections and a democratic transition after decades of civil war and colonial rule), rather than military. The mission also brought about the innovation of several important peacekeeping mechanisms that are still in use today, namely, a western "Contact Group," an elaborate "information program," and most significantly, UN "civilian policing." Overall, the operation was successful on two fronts: first, in terms of implementing the Security Council Resolution 435 (29 September 1978) mandate, although the start of implementation was delayed by ten years; and second, by creating the conditions for ongoing political stability in post-independence Namibia. The main source of UNTAG's success stemmed from the leadership's insistence that the UN had to establish an operation that, in the eyes of the Namibian people, was legitimate, authoritative, and authentic. This focus on local legitimacy compelled the staff of UNTAG to learn directly from ordinary Namibians about how to assist in ending the civil war, and to adapt organizational routines to the specificity of the Namibian environment.

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Howard. 2012. ''U.S. Foreign Policy and Path Dependence in Bosnia.'' In The International Community and Statebuilding, edited by Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western. Routledge Series on Intervention and Statebuilding.

Abstract
This chapter examines how the broad coalition of international actors that came to lead statebuilding efforts in Bosnia ended up supporting rigid ethnic group rights. This outcome is particularly puzzling because adhering to such principles leads to the institutionalization of states that are divided along rigid ethnic lines, paralyzed by reified ethnic animosity, and are generally incapable of being governed without significant external assistance. That is to say, in spite of statebuilders' pursuit of peace and democracy, they instead fostered negative peace and the creation of an "ethnocracy." Why? And how does this question relate to this volume's interest in coalitional behavior and the challenges multiple actors encounter as they engage in statebuilding? I answer these questions by focusing on the events and "critical junctures" that took place before and during the Dayton peace negotiations, which undergirded the Bosnian statebuilding process.

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Howard and Howard. 2003. ''The Influence of Public Opinion on France's Bosnia Policy.'' In International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis, edited by Richard Sobel and Eric Shiraev. Lexington Books.

Abstract
The issue of intervention in Bosnia poses a challenge to this shared assumption about the French elite's insulation from public opinion. This chapter will summarize how, in certain crucial ways during the time period in question-from the beginning of the war to the end of 1996-France's policy on Bosnia was influenced by the pressures of public opinion. We argue that public opinion worked in two ways: first, it provided general pressures over time that gradually influenced the direction of French policy; and second, usually in response to specific events on the ground that were captured by television cameras, it exerted intense pressure that contributed to the turning points in France's Bosnia policy. We show how the gap between French policy and public opinion, initially quite wide, gradually narrowed over time, as the government's policy shifted in the direction of public opinion.

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