Peace operations are a broad category of military interventions undertaken for the purposes of humanitarian relief, conflict stabilization, ceasefire monitoring, and implementing peace agreements in response to war or disaster. They encompass a variety of conflict management, peacebuilding, and statebuilding missions, strategies, and techniques. Peace operations are the “signature activity” of the United Nations (UN). They are the most expensive and most visible of the UN’s programs, and they are associated with the core functions and challenges of contemporary international organizations. It is in peace operations staged within war-decimated places that international organizations have most approximated substitute Leviathans, standing in for the state and organizing order, force, and law.


Since the late 1940s, peace operations have operated under legal mandates issued by the UN Security Council, and have been executed by a diverse but consistent set of actors that include major and former colonial powers, multinational forces acting under the aegis of the UN, and regional organizations marshaling standing or national armies. By the end of 2015, there were over 120,000 personnel serving in sixteen UN-led operations, making UN peace operations the second largest active military force in the world.4

This chapter discusses peace operations' origins; their evolution alongside the growing international conflict management structures of the UN and other international organizations; and their core functions, composition, and efficacy. Although peace operations have roots in earlier forms of military intervention, their emergence as a dominant tool for conflict management is a distinct innovation of the same internationalist project that forged the UN.5 Their evolution lays bare the fundamental tensions between state interests and the liberal internationalist project of a "world organization for the enforcement of peace," and their execution has defined the way wars are fought today.6 We focus on UN peace operations throughout because they are the modal type of mission in the world. The conclusion discusses the use of force within peace operations, an issue of growing importance that highlights fundamental tensions in the authorization and execution of internationally led efforts to maintain global peace and security. Taken together, these issues set in relief larger debates on cooperation between states, global integration, and the efficacy of intervention that characterize scholarship on international organizations.

**DEFINITIONS**

We classify peace operations as the internationally sanctioned deployment of military personnel or police to a war-torn area with the stated purpose of upholding an agreement after fighting has stopped or of limiting violence between warring parties and promoting an environment for conflict resolution.7 This is a narrow

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7 This definition draws on Diehl, *Peace Operations*. 
definition that includes multidimensional missions with large civilian components but excludes peacebuilding and political missions that are primarily composed of civilians.9 Other chapters in this volume offer sustained analysis of human rights, humanitarian action, and development; accordingly, we focus our attention on missions with a substantial military component. Although peace operations may have many goals and may deploy a wide set of military and diplomatic tools, by our definition all carry the UN Security Council's seal of approval.9 Indeed, the UN is the international actor most associated with peace operations, although regional organizations and single states have shouldered a substantial and growing portion of the operational burden over the last two decades. Irrespective of any mission's composition, however, its legitimacy and legality stem from the UN Security Council. This function of the Security Council is so deeply entrenched that even powerful single states staging military intervention and occupation have sought the UN's approval.10

The definition of "peace operations," however, remains contested and politicized. Actors have claimed the term for actions that in other times might have been called war, occupation, or trusteeship, as those terms have become less politically desirable.11 The UN Charter famously does not refer to peacekeeping. Peace operations in their current guise are issued under UN Charter Chapter VI, concerning the pacific settlement of disputes, or under Chapter VII, which covers threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression—"Chapter Six and Half," as Dag Hammarskjöld framed them.12

Without a formalized doctrine for peace operations, the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has defined peace operations in various ways: as "a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the

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8 These missions include the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq and the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan.
9 The definition we offer here thus includes armed interventions that are lead by a single state with the approval of the UN Security Council (such as France's 2006 activity in Côte d'Ivoire), but excludes armed interventions lead by a single state without the UN Security Council's approval.
peacemakers, by simply listing civilian and military peacekeepers' most common functions, or by offering a continuum of activities ranging from conflict prevention to peacebuilding.

Scholars have advanced a wide range of typologies to classify peace operations. In their 2000 study, Doyle and Sambanis specify four types of peace operations—monitoring or observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement—dividing missions on the basis of their UN mandates. Scholars disagree on whether to distinguish operations primarily by their means or by their ends. This variety of definitions reflects the ways in which peace operations may bleed conceptually, theoretically, and operationally into war fighting, statebuilding, and peacebuilding.

The most commonly specified division is between consent- and enforcement-based operations, or between "traditional," Chapter VI interpositional peacekeeping missions and post-Cold War Chapter VII enforcement missions. The Security Council authorizes "traditional" peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI for the pacific settlement of disputes, and they hew to the three general rules—limited force, consent of the warring parties, and impartiality. Peace enforcement missions are authorized under Chapter VII of the mandate, invoking the Security Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. They are closer to conventional military operations: soldiers undertake coercive actions, have greater military capacity, and may not have been authorized with the consent of all warring parties in place.

Aside from the issue of consent, peacekeeping and peace enforcement have generally differed in three major respects: purpose, means, and actors. First, the basic purpose of a peacekeeping mission is usually to implement peace accords that have
already been agreed to by the warring parties, regional actors, and the UN Security Council. In other words, peacekeepers are tasked with implementing existing peace agreements, not creating peace. The purpose of peace enforcement is to end fighting by means of military force.

Second, the means at peacekeepers and peace enforcers' disposal have often been very different. UN peacekeeping troops hail from dozens of different countries and often spend little (if any) time training together before deployment. Their armor is often light and may not be interoperable across units of different nationalities, and they do not always have common languages by which to communicate. They are capable of tasks like monitoring ceasefires and escorting and retraining troops, but they generally cannot use military force (except in self-defense). Unlike peacekeeping troops, peace enforcers must be able to fight as coherent units.

Third, in terms of actors, the UN is tasked with the vast majority of international peacekeeping operations. In contrast, peace enforcement has often been the domain of single states or small coalitions of the willing (such as the British Special Forces operation in Sierra Leone, the US operation in Liberia, French operations in Côte D'Ivoire, and the Australian-led International Force for East Timor). Regional organizations have also often played the role of peace enforcer, as did the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia and Kosovo; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali; and the African Union (AU) in Somalia. The distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement has been fading, however, as mission mandates have evolved.

**Evolving Mandates**

Most early missions, from peacekeeping's inception with the UN Truce Supervision Organization in 1948 through the end of the Cold War, were designed as interpositional forces to monitor ceasefire arrangements between states. This was as much a political innovation as it was a political necessity: while peacekeeping was a novel option for conflict management in the modern state system, it was also fundamentally limited by the composition of the Security Council and the bipolar Cold War structure of the international system. Since US and Soviet agreement was required to authorize missions, new peacekeeping missions were rare. There was only one peacekeeping mission in a civil war—Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), the UN Operation in the Congo—as some intrastate conflicts were proxy

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19 Diehl, Peace Operations.
superpower wars that permanent Security Council members were in no rush to turn over to peacekeepers. Fourteen peacekeeping missions were authorized during the Cold War’s forty years, while fifty-five missions have been authorized in the twenty-seven years that have followed it.  

We identify three types of peacekeeping missions: first, interpositional missions deployed along borders between states, authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; second, complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations in civil wars; and third, complex peace enforcement operations authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use force, often to protect civilians. Although progression between types was not perfectly generational, the three types are roughly demarcated by major world-historical events—the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, and 9/11.

INTERPOSITIONAL PEACEKEEPING

The first type of peacekeeping mission involved observing ceasefires between formerly warring states. These missions were lightly armed for defensive purposes and charged primarily with preventing defection from agreements and providing information that prevented accidental engagement and cheating on ceasefire agreements, with few combat or humanitarian tasks. Their function was primarily to deter interstate hostilities with their presence. The Security Council usually authorized these missions under its authority for the pacific settlement of disputes without authorizing them to use force. Several of these missions—the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, the UN Disengagement Observer Force, and the UN Truce Supervision Organization—continue today, serving as buffers and tripwires between antagonistic, if not actively belligerent, states.

Most peace operations in this period were a foreign policy innovation, not a military innovation—they signaled the international community’s interest in conflict resolution through the use of force, and their success or failure could be evaluated by international observers. They were often designed to provide an incentive for belligerents to negotiate settlements in good faith while the international community imposed pressure on them to do so. Most of these missions were short-lived and ended with the return of peace, but some, such as the UN Police Observer Group in Cyprus (1964–1965), were more lasting and successful. The UN Military Observer Group in Georgia (1993–2008) was another example of a mission that was effective in maintaining peace between formerly warring states.


Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?

resolution without a commitment to resolve conflict with armed force. They were sparingly deployed, and they hewed to the three traditional “rules” of peacekeeping: the consent of all parties, impartiality, and the limited use of force by peacekeepers. The doctrinal rules of peacekeeping and the multilateral nature of the interventions made these missions palatable even in a polarized international system and distinguished such operations as a cooperative activity of international organizations that was distinct from, and was intended to stop, war fighting.

**MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS**

The end of the Cold War brought about major changes in both the number and type of peace operations. With the thaw in the Security Council, thirty-eight new missions were authorized between 1989 and 1999, and eighteen new missions between 1989 and 1994 alone. These missions were for the most part deployed to intrastate, rather than interstate conflicts, as civil war became the modal form of conflict at the Cold War’s end, and as the decline of superpower support changed the technologies of rebellion with which these wars were fought. Peace operations acquired additional functions, as well: multidimensional missions within states began charging the UN not simply with the political task of observing ceasefires, but also with civilian and military functions like electoral assistance, delivering humanitarian aid, rebuilding judicial and economic institutions, police retraining, troop demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration.

Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali laid out these new goals in his 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping*. In it, he welcomed a new era of possible action following the “crippled” possibilities of the Cold War and argued that the UN should foster peace and international security by meeting internal strife with an arsenal of economic, institutional, and diplomatic tools. The DPKO was established in 1992, transforming peacekeeping from an ad hoc activity authorized by the Security Council and

24 Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*.
overseen by the Secretariat's political staff into a complex set of policy tools with their own overseeing department. This move gave international peace operations a specific institutional home, a bureaucracy charged with their oversight, and a centralized staff to plan and coordinate missions whose military staff was still drawn from the volunteer pool of troop-contributing countries. The development of a peacekeeping bureaucracy gave peace operations an organizational nucleus with its own developing interests and institutional culture, while troops were still drawn from countries that volunteered for the task.28

Boutros-Ghali's ambitious agenda found early support with the powerful Security Council members and was met with increased demand for intervention. With only a few exceptions in the mid 1990s (the Balkans missions and UNOSOM II in Somalia), these missions all had Chapter VI mandates, authorized under the Security Council's offices for pacific settlement of disputes, and most were tied to a political negotiation process with UN oversight or Secretariat investment.

**SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND THE BRAHIMI REPORT**

The confluence of peacemaking and multidimensional peacekeeping was a historically new phenomenon.29 The quick flurry of mission authorizations in the early 1990s also demonstrated that the UN was underresourced. No other international organization had the purview, political will, or material resources to take up these missions, and single states and troop-contributing countries were reluctant to undertake intervention alone, particularly when faced with potential personnel losses. Despite the important successes in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique, the human costs of peacekeeping failures were vivid and staggering during this era.30 Between 1993 and 1995, there were three highly publicized, brutal


29 Indeed, since the end of World War II, there have been more negotiated settlements than any other time in history (Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, 3rd ed. (London: Sage, 2012), and since the end of the Cold War, negotiated settlements have risen even more while the likelihood that wars will end in military victory has declined (Virginia Page Fortna, "Where Have All the Victories Gone? Peacekeeping and War Outcomes," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (September 2009); see also UN, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (New York, 2004)).

30 Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. 
collapses of peace operations, including the pivotal deaths of US and Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993. The tragedies in Somalia extinguished US support for the new peacekeeping agenda, reduced political will for robust interventions among troop contributing countries and the Security Council, and thereby enabled genocide, massacres, and ethnic cleansing to continue in Rwanda, Angola, and Srebrenica despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. These failures entrenched peacekeeping as a losing game in the public imagination of wealthy donor states. They also triggered a generation of scholarship focused on the sources of the UN’s failures and stayed the profusion of new missions: between late 1993 and 1998, the UN’s only major mission authorization was in Eastern Slavonia; several smaller, more modest missions were authorized in this time period.

Peace operations did not cease, however. Instead, these failures began a period in which powerful states shifted their focus away from UN peacekeeping, and from UN peacekeeping contributions, toward hybrid missions “where the Western troop contribution [sat] outside UN command and control structures.” Financial and troop contributions shifted outside the UN toward peace operations conducted by the AU, ECOWAS, and, notably, NATO, which spearheaded the UN-mandated Implementation Force in Bosnia from 1995 to 2004.

Failures also provoked UN-wide introspection and reform. The Report of the Panel on UN Peacekeeping Operations, known as the “Brahimi Report” (2000), advocated comprehensive reform for the DPKO in the wake of the failed operations of the 1990s. Its panel of expert authors argued that the UN had overstretched its abilities; that it could do more to protect civilians in conflict; and that UN peacekeeping would have to be more robust in order to be more effective. It also recommended the UN refuse missions for which its peacekeeping apparatus lacked resources. The DPKO underwent a series of reforms and grew by 50 percent in size in accordance with the report’s recommendations.

The Brahimi Report pushed peace operations away from the three traditional rules of peacekeeping by recommending better protection of civilians and creating a more robust fighting posture in UN peacekeeping. Early, limited multidimensional missions that hewed to the three rules had produced stable agreements

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31 Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature”; Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.
33 Fortna and Howard, in “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” outline this scholarship.
36 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.
and comparative peace in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Cambodia, but impartiality, consent, and a very limited mandate to use force were also seen as facilitating conditions for some of the worst tragedies that occurred on the UN's watch: the UN had mandated peacekeeping behavior that seemed to confer moral equivalency on groups bent on massacring civilians while lacking the capacity or legal authorization to stop massacres. The heightened use of force in civil wars, required for greater civilian protection and a robust fighting posture, could be compatible with impartiality and consent but required a new kind of operational mandate.

Beginning in 1999, the UN authorized an increasing number of peace enforcement mandates under Chapter VII of its charter, turning from traditional peace operations toward mandates that justified intervention in the defense of international peace and security. Today, all multidimensional peacekeeping operations have Chapter VII peace enforcement provisions. The shift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII mandates is not simply semantic: contemporary Chapter VII missions are authorized to use force most notably to protect civilians, in self-defense, and in defense of the mandate. The limited Chapter VII mandate to use force in defense of civilians began in Sierra Leone, which received the first Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians in conflict. Since then, it has gained consensus among Security Council members and has been authorized in nearly every mission since 2006.

The protection of civilians norm has been less controversial than the related Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, which originated alongside discussions of civilian protection. R2P arose on the heels of the UN's failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica. It was the subject of a series of Canadian-led reports and Security

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39 This mandate has been repeated verbatim no fewer than eight times since 1999, including in the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) mandates.
Council debates in the early 2000s. While many Western nations favored framing humanitarian intervention in terms of responsibilities, many developing nations feared that the formalization of such a doctrine might erode the sovereignty norms that had helped avert major interstate war since World War II. The debates culminated in the 2009 formulation of a three-pillared approach to R2P wherein “protection” and “rebuilding” are clearly preferential to the last resort of “action.”

The R2P debates were matched by similar normative moves across the UN system: the Brahimi Report (2000) advocated comprehensive reform for DPKO, while a host of thematic resolutions publicly outlined the Security Council’s positions on civilians in armed conflict, children and armed conflict, and women and armed conflict. Thus, in the early 2000s, a formal normative architecture around the protection of civilians and vulnerable populations in conflict emerged at the UN. Peace operations became a tool with which to protect civilians in conflict, not merely a new diplomatic tool to stop or prevent the recurrence of conflict. The formal adoption of the norm charges the international community to act in defense of the victims of conflict and in lieu of states that are unwilling to do so.

Concurrent with these normative shifts was the United States’ renewed interest in peace operations following 9/11. After the Clinton administration’s early enthusiasm for peacekeeping faded in the early 1990s, US involvement in peace operations was limited. The United States became increasingly concerned with failed states after 9/11, however, viewing them as potential breeding grounds for al-Qaeda, similar terrorist organizations, and strategic threats to international security. Beginning in 2002, the United States ceased actively blocking efforts for more robust peacekeeping missions and provided increased financial support to UN peacekeeping operations. President George W. Bush’s advisers, some of whom were famous for their anti-UN rhetoric, oversaw the largest budgetary expansions in the UN’s history—a doubling of the operational budget, and tripling of the UN peacekeeping budget starting in 2003. Other emerging powers—including China, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria—also began to contribute more resources to UN peace operations.

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In light of these transformations, the UN has become the arbiter of situations in which civilians are falling victim to civil war, genocide, state failure, and state predation. Whether or not Security Council members themselves cleave to R2P, they have acted to implement it: the Security Council is more likely now to deploy a peace operation where belligerents target the civilian population, and conflicts with higher levels of civilian targeting are more likely to receive robust operational mandates. The Security Council has granted these mandates even when it has not granted commensurate resources to execute the mandates.

While the R2P norm is strong enough to animate the repeated authorization of Chapter VII mandates to protect civilians, it is not strong enough to override the interests of powerful states, which persist as the engine of Security Council action. Despite concurrent Security Council support for forceful action in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Libya, for example, the deadlock between the United States, Russia, and China on Syria from 2011 to 2015 indicates that Great Power rivalries have not subsided. Like Cold War-era interpositional missions, the limited Chapter VII mandate to use force is possible only when the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) agree.

There is early evidence, however, that deadlock on action to protect civilians is less acceptable to the UN’s member states than it was during the Cold War—in August 2012, for instance, the UN General Assembly formally rebuked the Security Council for its inaction on Syria. In the context of the growing normative architecture surrounding intervention, and a growing number of peacekeeping missions worldwide, what was once status quo for the Security Council may have become deplorable.

Chapter VII mandate authorizations have, however, often outstripped the UN’s actual capacity to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Indeed, the authorization to use force is frequently granted, but peacekeepers still rarely use force; when they do, it is in accordance with their national rules of engagement. The patchwork nature of troop contributions and the diffuse nature of the UN’s central command and control structure mean that peacekeepers use force when their national capitals deem it in line with their rules of engagement. The actual protection of civilians varies in accordance with which battalions are on the ground.

Moreover, it is important to distinguish between war fighting and the limited Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence. Analysts


45 While the Security Council has struggled to find common ground over Syria, in December 2015, despite serious strategic differences, the Council collectively endorsed a road map for peace and a national ceasefire (S/RES/2254, SC/12171). These actions were not Chapter VII actions and, as of this writing, did not point to an imminent UN mission to Syria.

46 The P5 are the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. Any member of the P5 may unilaterally veto Security Council actions.

usually frame peace enforcement operations as closer to conventional military operations; these missions are undertaken with the will of the Security Council, not the will of the warring parties, as a guide to action.\(^{48}\) The prevailing mode of Chapter VII mandates does not authorize actual military action absent an immediate threat to the civilian population or to UN staff. It is in partial recognition of this fact, and in recognition of its long, checkered history in the DRC, that the UN authorized its first-ever Intervention Brigade in 2013, establishing a unit within the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the larger, more traditional peacekeeping operation, and granting "the brigade a mandate to carry out offensive operations alone or with Congolese Army troops to neutralize and disarm militant groups."\(^{49}\) The Intervention Brigade in the Congo has some antecedents, including Anglo-French "rapid reaction" ground forces in Bosnia operating alongside the UN Protection Force, but the Security Council resolution establishing the Brigade came with the explicit note that its authorization was "on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping."\(^{50}\) At the time of writing, important questions persist about its composition, its efficacy, how it will distinguish itself from other parts of MONUSCO, and how peace operations will navigate the transition from neutrality to partisan military postures. Its authorization signals the continually evolving nature of peace operations and the challenges and limitations of military actions undertaken by international organizations, which sit uncomfortably alongside an expressly stated commitment to the "agreed principles" of traditional peacekeeping. The 2008 report *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Best Practices Section began the work of bridging foundational UN doctrine and growing challenges to peace operations in the field, while the 2015 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations began the process of grappling with the growing turn toward military force postures with which future reports will also have to contend.

**MISSION COMPOSITION**

Peace operations are characterized by a division of labor: the warring parties request assistance implementing a peace agreement, the Security Council authorizes

\(^{48}\) Diehl, *Peace Operations*.


\(^{50}\) Ibid.
a mission and its mandate; the Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations plan the mission and staff its political positions; and troop-contributing countries provide troops, police, political staff, equipment, and other resources.

Troop contributions come from a heterogeneous group of more than 100 small and middle powers with extensive military resources, with varying motivations for contribution and varying levels of contribution. For regional hegemons, including Nigeria, South Africa, and Brazil, troop contributions may be framed as a duty that falls to powerful states. Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India rank high on the list of troop contributing countries that participate in peace operations for both increased international prestige and resources. Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda are all steadily increasing their contributions, while the “West” has alternated between providing troops and financial support.

The current system of troop contributions is what one analyst called a “blue helmet caste system”: wealthy countries finance peacekeeping, while poor countries provide peacekeepers who “die in far higher numbers than their wealthier counterparts.” While this neglects the advance role that former colonial powers, such as France and the United Kingdom, have played in enforcement operations, one of the troubling recent trends in peacekeeping is an increasing divide between the Global North and South: “The first world sets the policies, and third world supplies the troops.” This division is set in relief by debates on the Chapter VII Mandate to protect civilians: the P3 (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) have been at the forefront of the move toward Chapter VII force mandates in peacekeeping operations, while fewer states from the global South have been pushing the Chapter VII agenda.

Nor are the peacekeeping troop suppliers seeking force mandates in order to better defend their troops on the ground; troop-supplying countries argue they can defend themselves under

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52 Recent statistics on comparative contributions to the UN's general budget are as follows: the United States provides 22% (or $532,435,102), Japan (12.53%), Germany (8.018%), the United Kingdom (6.604%), and France (6.112%). See Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield, "United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1990–2010," Congressional Research Services, January 15, 2013. For the 2013 UN Peacekeeping budget, which is approximately $7.33 billion, the United States is assessed at 27.14% (or nearly $2 billion), Japan (12.53%), the United Kingdom (8.15%), Germany (8.02%), France (7.55%), Italy (5.00%), China (3.93%), and Canada (3.21%). See A/67/224, August 3, 2012.


55 At the time of writing, it remains unclear whether and how recent moves such as the Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians, a series of 2015–16 pledges initiated by the United States, the Netherlands, and Rwanda concerning the implementation of civilian norms in peace operations, will affect this long-running division.
Chapter VI. In this sense, the Council's P3 members are not responsible for the implementation of the mandates that they set, while troop-contributing countries lack the necessary institutional power to alter mandates. This divide results in a hierarchy within the peacemaking apparatus.

**Efficacy**

The popular perception of peace operations—particularly those led by the UN—is that they are largely ineffective. Scholars have engaged seriously with whether or not peacekeeping works, however, and have found that it can be very effective under some conditions. If we adopt a broad definition as Page Fortna does—the collapse of any peace agreement overseen by a guarantor—there have been fourteen major peacekeeping failures since the end of the Cold War out of the fifty-five peacekeeping missions authorized since 1989, which makes for a failure rate of slightly over one in four. When we consider that peacekeeping is often the last-ditch solution to an already intractable problem, these are comparatively favorable statistics. Indeed, major works have found that, ceteris paribus, peace operations make agreements more likely to be implemented and the peace more likely to hold: combatants are 20 percent more likely to implement the terms of a peace agreement with a third-party guarantee in place, and by conservative estimates, peacekeepers' presence cuts the risk of recidivism by more than half; by less conservative estimates, they lower the hazard of backsliding by 75 or 85 percent. Moreover, as transitional authorities, complex multidimensional peace operations have been successful at reconstructing decimated states and handing power back to them, a rather remarkable feat.

Finally, there is good evidence that peacekeeping limits the diffusion of conflict across national borders, preventing domestic strife from becoming regional.

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57 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?
59 Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?
60 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.
At the most basic level, peace operations do, then, seem to work; peace operations are not just the UN’s “signature activity,” but a highly effective activity of international organizations: states coordinating multilaterally sanctioned military action to oversee agreements and to maintain international peace and security through the UN Secretariat, the DPKO, NATO, the AU, and ECOWAS have improved security outcomes for states at war. Further examination of the empirical work on peace operations, however, reveals that answers about peacekeeping’s efficacy are highly contingent on the measure of success, the kind of mission deployed, and the actors involved. A key problem in this scholarship is the selection problem—peace operations are not distributed randomly, and peacekeepers therefore systematically select into cases that conform to two criteria: (1) where no member of the P5 has vetoed or will veto action; (2) where other options have been exhausted; that is, the hardest conflict cases. First, these criteria indicate that peace operations are most likely to go where no P5 member has an overwhelming strategic interest, although this norm pattern may be declining. Second, much like hospitals are the destination where patients are most likely to die, peacekeepers will most likely be where destruction is imminent. This is particularly true as peace operations have evolved away from classic interpositional peacekeeping. Accordingly, scholars have adopted an increasingly sophisticated set of quantitative and qualitative methodologies at multiple levels of analysis to disaggregate the situational difficulty of the conflict from the peace operation’s efficacy.

To begin, for example, the evolution from interpositional Chapter VI to Chapter VII enforcement mandates has not been matched by a neat, linear relationship between mandate strength and mission efficacy. Indeed, most existing work tells us that the UN is effective at keeping the peace, but that it is not particularly effective at using force to establish peace: while case studies and statistical work comparing cases with and without peacekeeping indicate that UN peacekeeping is successful at maintaining an already negotiated peace, work within the universe of peacekeeping cases indicates that UN interventions are effective in post-civil conflict interventions, but have no causal effect on ongoing civil wars.

Scholarship that evaluates peacekeeping alongside measures of conflict severity offers an additional wrinkle. A key problem in this literature is “[distinguishing] between the ability of peacekeeping missions to prevent potential mass murderers from actually resorting to a strategy of mass killing, on the one hand, and the

62 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars; on the potential decline, see Bellamy and Williams, “The West and Contemporary Peace Operations.”
capacity of peacekeepers to stop ongoing massacres, on the other.” Findings converge on two points: (1) that peacekeepers are poorly equipped to deal with ongoing massacres and will sometimes exacerbate ongoing violence; (2) that peacekeepers are most likely to be sent where civilians are under imminent threat of violence to begin with, but they appear to have a preventative effect on mass atrocities, particularly when they are charged with keeping a formally negotiated peace.65

Following political science’s overall turn toward the finer-grained levels of analysis, some scholars have adopted a local approach to evaluating peace operations.66 This scholarship notes that the national-level approach that the Security Council (and most scholars) adopt in evaluating peace operations often ignores the local level at which peace operations actually unfold.67 Séverine Autesserre’s ethnographic work on the DRC, for example, has found that peace operations often arrive with a plan for, and culture of, peacebuilding that operates at the national level and has little relevance to local-level violence. This peacebuilding culture in many cases normalizes high local levels of violence, while the simplifying narratives that policy makers, journalists, advocacy groups, and practitioners on the ground employ may lead to heightened human rights violations.68

The divergent results from varying levels of analysis and methodologies may also reflect the highly contingent nature of peacekeeping’s efficacy and the classic and severe endogeneity problems that plague scholarship on its success. While scholars have adopted ever more sophisticated ways to deal with this problem, separating the difficulty of the problem peacekeepers face from the effect that they have on preventing conflict is a challenge that requires methodological sophistication and deep case knowledge. Results can be highly sensitive to the method, specification, and cases examined.

One final issue should shade our measurement of peace operations’ efficacy: over what timeframe we should expect success. Three of the UN’s longest running and

68 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo and “Hobbes and the Congo.”
most notable peacekeeping engagements—the DRC, Sudan, and Haiti—are responsible for much of peace operations' negative press. In all three locations, moreover, the UN has compounded intractable conflict with either scandal or highly visible inefficacy—whether through retreat when faced by rebels, allegations of sexual abuse, or involvement in the spread of epidemics.\textsuperscript{69} And in all three locations, if we were to choose an arbitrary date line and draw the mission to a close on that day, we would have to call each mission a failure. They have not collapsed or ended, however; in the most technical sense, they may yet succeed as a result. Any evaluation of peace operations must take into account the way these cases sit alongside more easily defined successes and failures.\textsuperscript{70}

Despite these qualifications, however, scholars agree that conflicts that receive peace operations are more likely to implement and uphold peace agreements than conflicts left to flame out on their own. As a novel alternative to war and diplomacy, then, peace operations are an evolving policy tool with some indications of efficacy. Their successes, however modest, represent an arena in which international organizations are stitching together centralized authority from anarchy: since the Cold War, the international maintenance of peace and security has ever more resided with the UN and regional organizations acting under its authorization. Thus, the relative efficacy of international peace operations likely guarantee their continued importance to states stricken by conflict and states interested in maintaining global stability.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

When peacekeeping was invented after World War II, it was considered a major innovation in war and peace—although peacekeepers carried light weapons for defensive purposes, they were deployed "to help everyone and to harm no one."\textsuperscript{71} Today, peace operations have become increasingly hard to distinguish from war.


\textsuperscript{70} Anjali Dayal, "UN Peacekeeping and Links between Civil War Peace Processes," PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2015.

The Security Council has developed a standard practice of issuing Chapter VII force mandates for UN peacekeepers by default rather than by design, often with negative results. Most discussions about the legitimacy of the Security Council focus on membership, but there remain real and pressing questions about the Council’s right to make decisions about the international use of force when Council members are divorced from both the implementation and the effectiveness of the mandates they issue, and when they are rarely the executors or the recipients of peace operations.\footnote{Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform,” \textit{Global Governance} 14 (2008): 199–217.}

Indeed, the question of which entities in the international system ought to wield legitimate force in internal conflicts will become even more pressing very soon, and much will, once again, depend on European decisions, with tens of thousands of European troops available for other activities, including peacekeeping, following the drawdown of international troops in Afghanistan.\footnote{Howard and Dayal, “The ‘Tyranny of Getting to Yes’ and the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping.”} In order to maintain defense budgets in a time of austerity, ministries of defense must engage in some activity, and peacekeeping or peace enforcement would be logical. Moreover, the current Secretary-General’s term is set to expire in 2016; if the historic norm holds, the next UN Secretary-General may hail from a second-tier European power.\footnote{Peacekeeping has not been one of the eighth UN Secretary-General’s priorities.} Thus in a short time, we may be facing a European UN Secretary-General, thousands of available European troops, and ongoing civil wars across the globe. Will those troops be allocated to UN peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or be set aside for non-UN peace enforcement? Or will the current “caste system” dividing the labor of mandate authorization and the operational securing of the peace prevail? Greater European involvement in peace enforcement—particularly where peace enforcement has entailed state-building and the policing of failed states—may leave internationally led peace operations open to delegitimizing and damaging charges of imperialism, even while improving the operational capacity of peacekeeping. However, the current system of two-tiered involvement in peace operations is likely also untenable, as shifting geopolitics change the power and capabilities of troop-contributing countries. New cooperative developments between members of the P5, European powers, and troop-contributing countries indicate that key actors are trying to bridge these deep fault lines; how precisely this will affect peace operations on the ground remains to be seen.\footnote{“CONCEPT NOTE: The Future of Civilian Protection in Peace Operations Endorsing and Implementing the Kigali Principles,” May 11, 2016, UNHQ NY, http://www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2016/01/Concept-note-Kigali-Principles-event-final.pdf.}

Creatively rethinking the politics of force and peace operations is not out of the question. Peace operations have evolved a great deal since they began after World
War II, fundamentally changing the way both powerful and weak states deal with war; making very real, in some parts of the world, the liberal international ideal of an organization that meaningfully addresses the scourge of war; and stepping into governance voids when it suits the will of the Security Council. This evolution may, in turn, necessitate new forms of cooperation between states that want to maintain the legitimacy of the international organizations that undertake peace operations.