

## CHAPTER 22

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# UNITED NATIONS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG)

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## INTRODUCTION

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THE United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed to Namibia from April 1989 until March 1990. It was the UN's first attempt at engaging in multidimensional peacekeeping after the demise of the Congo operation (ONUC) in 1964. UNTAG differed from many previous UN peacekeeping operations in that its primary means and purpose were political (in organizing free elections and a democratic transition after decades of civil war and colonial rule), rather than military. The mission also brought about the innovation of several important peacekeeping mechanisms that are still in use today, namely, a western "Contact Group," an elaborate "information program," and most significantly, UN "civilian policing." Overall, the operation was successful on two fronts: first, in terms of implementing the Security Council Resolution 435 (29 September 1978) mandate, although the start of implementation was delayed by ten years; and second, by creating the conditions for ongoing political stability in post-independence Namibia. The main source of UNTAG's success stemmed from the leadership's insistence that the UN had to establish an operation that, in the eyes of the Namibian people, was legitimate, authoritative, and authentic. This focus on local legitimacy compelled the staff of UNTAG to learn directly from ordinary Namibians about how to assist in ending the civil war, and to adapt organizational routines to the specificity of the Namibian environment.

Formerly known as South West Africa, Namibia is sparsely populated, about one and a half times the size of France, and has two vast deserts. It was colonized by Germany in



the late 1800s during which time the colonists committed genocide against the Herero and Nama tribes.<sup>1</sup> After Germany's defeat in the First World War, South Africa occupied the territory. South West Africa was then under British control for a brief period, later to be re-occupied by South Africa in 1920. After the Second World War, South West Africa was slated to come under UN Trusteeship, but given its interests in Namibia's diamond and mineral mines, plus a desire to protect the minority white way of life, South Africa refused to relinquish control.

By the late 1950s, South Africa had institutionalized its system of *apartheid* in Namibia, and in 1966, armed conflict broke out between the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and South African forces. Ten years later, the UN General Assembly declared South African rule illegal, and named the SWAPO the "sole and authentic" representative of the Namibian people.<sup>2</sup>

The war in Namibia progressed over time from a guerilla war of independence to a civil war, as South Africa increasingly developed indigenous Namibian forces to fight against SWAPO. But the war was also part of a larger, decades-long regional struggle, with separate, but at times interrelated struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.<sup>3</sup>

In 1978, a settlement proposal, approved in UN Security Council Resolution 435, outlined the basic principles of a Namibian independence process assisted by the UN. However, international disputes rooted in the Cold War prevented the start of implementation for a decade. The rough international political division over Namibia was between, on one side, South Africa, the Namibian "internal parties," and at times the Western Contact Group.<sup>4</sup> On the other side stood SWAPO, the UN General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization for African Unity and the "front-line" states.<sup>5</sup>

The UNTAG mandate stemmed from three documents: the Contact Group's Settlement Proposal of 10 April 1978; the UN Secretary-General's report of 29 August 1978; and Security Council Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978. The Settlement Proposal called for free and fair elections to pave the way for a transition to independence. It included the appointment of a UN Special Representative, who would have to be satisfied "at each stage as to the fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the political process at all levels of administration before such measures take effect."<sup>6</sup> This resolution placed the Special Representative at the center of the political transition. Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari was chosen for the position in 1978, after his appointment as the UN General Assembly's Commissioner for Namibia starting the year before.<sup>7</sup>

Although implementation of the mandate would not commence until the Cold War began to thaw, the Settlement Proposal included a timetable for conducting elections, with explicit tasks that the UN, the South African government, and SWAPO were to fulfill. The elections were to create an independent and transitional Namibian Constituent Assembly, which would draw up a constitution immediately after being elected, and govern as the Namibian "National Assembly" from then on.



Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978 accepted the previous proposals, and this document constituted the legal basis of UNTAG. Ten years later, Security Council Resolution 632 of 16 February 1989 allowed for its start.

During the ten years between the mandate's authorization and beginning of implementation, armed battles over the victors of Namibian independence raged on. At the heart of the delay stood the American-, South African-, and British-agreed "linkage" policy, which stipulated that the 50,000 Cuban troops fighting alongside the Marxist-sympathetic Angolan government had to be withdrawn before Namibia could be granted independence. In late 1988, a military stalemate was reached after South Africa's and the Angolan rebels' defeat at the battle of Cuito Cuanevale in Angola. The large costs to South Africa of supporting the military operations in Angola and Namibia, coupled with anti-apartheid international economic sanctions, and the growing mobilization of church groups, students, and workers led the South African government to back down on its military campaigns. In addition, the ousting of the P. W. Botha administration, the release of Nelson Mandela, and Soviet pressure on the African National Congress and SWAPO to cease armed struggle, culminated in an opening in the Namibian negotiations.

South Africa insisted on excluding SWAPO from all official deliberations, a demand to which its main supporters on the Security Council—the US and the UK—assented. Subsequently, the Protocols of Geneva and Brazzaville, and the Tripartite Accord were all signed in 1988 by the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, under the mediation of American diplomat and scholar, Chester Crocker.<sup>8</sup> These agreements stipulated the withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Angola in exchange for Namibian independence, but the mechanics of political transition in Namibia were not specified. Since South Africa refused to legitimate SWAPO by signing an agreement directly with them, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar pieced together a ceasefire declaration between SWAPO and South Africa by having each party sign identical letters to him pledging to abide by Security Council Resolution 435, and the date of 1 April 1989 for the ceasefire.

## COURSE OF THE OPERATION

After a decade of delayed independence, the stage was finally set for UNTAG to commence operations in the spring of 1989. While the mandate had been approved in 1978, disputes over the budget and size of the UN's operation remained. SWAPO and its allies in the UN General Assembly sought more UN oversight, while budget-conscious members of the Security Council, especially the US, wanted a smaller operation (which was seen to favor South African-sympathetic interests in Namibia). In March 1989, the budget for the operation was cut from approximately US\$700 million to US\$416 million, but none of the implementation tasks was removed. Troop levels had been set originally at 7,500, and that number remained on paper, but only 4,500 would ever deploy. Since disagreements in



the UN Security Council and General Assembly about numbers dragged on until March, by 1 April 1989, the official start of the ceasefire, UNTAG had only 300 recently-arrived military observers on the ground. This inadequate presence helped precipitate the violent clashes of early April, which almost led to the downfall of the operation.

### MANDATE AND KEY FACTS

*Operation Mandate:* The April 1978 Western Contact Group's Settlement Proposal (S/12636) called for a negotiated ceasefire, a Namibian independence process with free and fair UN-monitored elections, UN personnel to "accompany" police during the transition, and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to exercise political control over the transition process with the ability to over-ride local decisions.

In his report dated 29 August 1978 (S/12827), the UN Secretary-General united civilian and military command under the SRSG and promised a one-year timeline for the mission.

Security Council Resolution 435 of 29 September 1978 accepted the Contact Group's proposal and the Secretary-General's report. The "UN Transitional Assistance Group" would create an environment suitable for the holding of free and fair elections to a Constituent Assembly that would then draft a Namibian constitution. The mission would include five parts: a political office to manage the transition to independence and democracy; a military department to oversee disarmament, withdrawal of South African forces, and re-constitution of Namibian Armed Forces; a civilian police division to monitor the abusive apartheid police and train a new police force; refugee repatriation by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and an electoral unit to prepare for and oversee elections.

The Tripartite Accord between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa stipulated Cuban and South African troop withdrawal. South Africa agreed to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 for the first time.

Identical letters to the UN Secretary-General from SWAPO and South Africa pledged to abide by Security Council Resolution 435, and 1 April 1989 for the ceasefire.

Security Council Resolution 632, 16 February 1989 authorized UNTAG to operate from April 1989 to March 1990.

*Strength:* 4,500 military, 1,500 civilian police, 2,000 civilian staff, 1,000 international elections monitors

*Personnel:* 51 countries; main troop suppliers: Finland, Kenya, Malaysia with 850 troops each

*Finance:* US\$416 million for one year of operation. Actual cost: US\$368.6 million

Despite disagreements at UN headquarters, UNTAG had a clear and centralized chain of command, and its offices were distributed across forty-two districts and regional centers. The spread of the operation allowed its staff to learn about the needs and worries of ordinary Namibians, while informing citizens about the coming elections, political parties, and democratic governance. The five central components of the mission included: overall establishment of UNTAG offices including the information program; military disarmament; civilian policing; refugee return; and preparations for, and the holding of, elections.<sup>9</sup> Each of these components confronted crises



or changing circumstances on the ground and dealt with them appropriately, including an early breach of the peace, and an attempted, but unsuccessful, breach ahead of the elections.

On 1 April 1989, the day that the UN operation was to begin, between 300 and 500 People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) fighters appeared on the Namibian/Angolan border. The brutal paramilitary force known as the Koevoet, along with South West African Territorial Forces (SWATF), and South African Defense Forces (SADF), began to fire at the PLAN, believing their intentions to be aggressive. SWAPO responded by sending reinforcements southward from Angola. The South African side requested of the UN that SADF forces, many of which had already been restricted to base, be released to fight in the battle. The SADF declared that their forces on the battlefield were outnumbered, and that the PLAN had to be stopped by force. UN Special Representative Martti Ahtisaari was unequipped to take military control of the situation. There were not nearly enough UNTAG forces in Namibia to enforce a ceasefire, moreover, UNTAG never had the capability to stop forces from fighting. Ahtisaari convinced Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to allow some SADF and SWATF troops to leave their bases to counter the perceived military attack. After nine days of fighting, more than 300 PLAN fighters and civilians and 13 SADF soldiers were killed. It looked as though UNTAG had failed even before it began. After these events all sides had reason to pull out of the hard-won agreements. But the momentum for peace had gathered mass and the crisis passed.

In retrospect, Ahtisaari holds that he was not particularly worried that the UNTAG military component was not on the ground to stand between the two sides during the 1 April crisis.<sup>10</sup> UNTAG was not mandated as an interposition force, and the seemingly pro-South African move to allow SADF forces to leave their bases also helped to convince South Africa that the UN was more even-handed in its outlook than assumed. As a consequence, the South Africans were more willing to compromise with UNTAG and eventually, SWAPO.

With the re-establishment of the ceasefire, the stage was set to begin the practical tasks of preparing the country for the November 1989 elections and independence thereafter. UNTAG attempted to accomplish much more than its officially mandated tasks. Most significantly, the leadership of UNTAG sought to establish its legitimacy by engaging directly with the Namibian people, not simply with the political elites.

Because of the delay in commencing mandate implementation, Ahtisaari had a decade to plan for not only the practical aspects, but also the social and political dimensions of UNTAG. An unpublished UN report on Namibia explained: "free and fair elections could take place only if no less than a major change in the overall atmosphere of the country had first taken place; so that the Namibian people could feel free, and sufficiently informed, to express genuine choice as to their future."<sup>11</sup>

Since 1978, Ahtisaari had been pushing for "a massive, active intervention by UNTAG to change the political climate in the country."<sup>12</sup> In order to achieve success, racial tensions, and military and police violence would have to be curbed through creative means. It was envisioned that UNTAG would:



interpose itself as a source of authentic and objective information in a country which had been starved of this for many years ... UNTAG would have, as a condition precedent to its success, to ensure that its legitimacy and authenticity were accepted throughout the country. The establishment of UNTAG's legitimacy, in turn, depended upon the perception of its effectiveness in dealing with the problems confronting the implementation, and upon its reputation for objectivity and integrity.<sup>13</sup>

The obstacles to achieving these objectives were numerous. Non-white Namibians had endured decades of oppression, a legacy of genocide, civil war, racial discrimination under apartheid, and disinformation campaigns. With an approximate 38 percent literacy rate, the UN had to resort to many creative means to communicate with the population. Furthermore, the 1 April crisis had increased mistrust on all sides just prior to the UN's full deployment.

The first step toward mandate implementation was to establish UNTAG's physical presence throughout Namibia. This was coordinated and administered through the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (OSRSG). There were three interrelated divisions of the political side of the operation: the OSRSG, UNTAG "centers," and the information program.

The OSRSG was responsible for the political direction and overall coordination of the operation. During the time of Namibia's delayed independence, Ahtisaari had become the UN's Under Secretary-General for Administration. He was active in recruiting the best staff available for the mission, and integrated an unprecedented percentage of women (40 percent) into UNTAG's staff.<sup>14</sup>

In order to establish UNTAG as a legitimate authority with all Namibians, Ahtisaari's strategy was to have his staff interact as much as possible with the local population. They were to strive for "moral" rather than merely "executive" authority by helping to create "a new atmosphere and climate of reconciliation."<sup>15</sup> In the "eyes, ears and voice" of UNTAG, as the district and regional centers have been called, "Staff were in constant contact with the local population and thus had instant feedback on their own performance permitting adjustment as necessary."<sup>16</sup>

Another integral part of the OSRSG became the information program. A mandate for this program was not specified in official documents, but Ahtisaari realized that some type of political information program would have to be instituted in order to foster dialogue and reconciliation.<sup>17</sup>

To counter rampant rumors and mis- and dis-information, UNTAG's staff resorted to diverse and creative methods. For example, after church services, staff would discuss their operations with thousands of Namibians on a weekly basis.<sup>18</sup> They met with community leaders, unionists, student groups, political groups, traditional groups, veterinarians associations, and farmers unions. Some of these meetings would last up to four or more hours. The staff's tenacity paid off, as "reports of intimidation decreased, numbers of peaceful political rallies increased, and dialogue, at all levels, commenced."<sup>19</sup>

That said, the South West African Broadcasting Commission (SWABC) continued to operate as a source of disinformation. Rather than shutting down the SWABC,



UNTAG used SWABC facilities to counteract disinformation on SWABC's own airwaves. Ahtisaari and his staff also sought frequent contact with local and international radio, television, and newspapers, by holding press conferences every day. Starting in June, UNTAG ran two radio programs each day, during the peak listening hours, in English, Afrikaans, and thirteen other Namibian languages. The staff also used T-shirts, posters, and skits to relay their messages. Within a relatively short period of time—9 months—UNTAG managed to inform the new citizens of Namibia about what was to happen in the November elections and beyond.

## ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

### Military demobilization

UNTAG's military component accomplished most of its tasks, even with drastically reduced funding, and despite the killing of eleven of its members over the course of the operation. The component had three main tasks: restricting to base and disarming SADF and SWAPO troops; monitoring SADF withdrawal from Namibia; and demobilizing the Namibian regular and territorial units who had fought against SWAPO (mainly the SWATF), dismantling their offices, and collecting and guarding their weapons.<sup>20</sup> At the time of the ceasefire, there were approximately 32,500 anti-SWAPO forces to disarm and demobilize, only about half of whom could be withdrawn from Namibia to South Africa. There are no reliable estimates of how many SWAPO forces were in the country, as they were mainly guerrilla troops and moved in and out of the civilian populations essentially without detection.

Despite the partial re-mobilization of the SADF and SWATF after the events of 1 April 1989, by mid-May they were confined to base and the last SADF departed for South Africa in November. SWATF demobilization was completed in September, although its former members continued to receive pay until February 1990. Continued pay was offered as a carrot to allow demobilized troops time to find new employment in Namibia.

Demobilizing the PLAN irregular forces was more complicated. Force Commander Prem Chand explained that "there was no question of clear cut bases, and SWAPO could not provide us with organizational tables containing the details of personnel, weapons, and ammunition."<sup>21</sup> UNTAG set up several bases in Angola where about 5,000 PLAN members were grouped, disarmed, and then released as civilians. The former combatants wound their way across the border, often as unarmed refugees returning in civilian clothing. By the end of UNTAG's mission, all tasks of the military mandate had been fulfilled, and, in the "spirit of reconciliation," PLAN and SWATF forces were integrated in equal numbers into the Namibian army.



## The Civilian Police (CIVPOL)

In contrast to the concrete military tasks, those of the CIVPOL were vague, and thus more open to re-design during the process of implementation. CIVPOL's tasks were not spelled-out in the Settlement Plan, although South Africa essentially agreed to an outline of the idea described only in these terms: "The Special Representative shall make arrangements when appropriate for UNTAG personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties."<sup>22</sup>

The primary functions of these UN "personnel," later named "CIVPOL," as outlined by the Police Advisor Steven Fanning, were to help enforce the law impartially, ensure that people could express their views without fear of harassment or intimidation, ensure an electoral process that was free from manipulation or interference by monitoring closely the actions of South West African Police (SWAPOL), and eventually to train a new Namibian police force.<sup>23</sup> Even though one can list these tasks, they overlap and are open to a wide range of interpretations. CIVPOL were placed under direct control of the civilian Special Representative, not the military division. They were to play a "psychological" role: "Local people needed to trust that the presence of the UN police would guarantee their freedom of political movement."<sup>24</sup>

In terms of their numbers, UNTAG's civilian police force was gradually increased to over 1,500, to monitor 8,250 SWAPOL, including about 3,000 members of the Koevoet. The CIVPOL hailed from thirty-four UN member states and were deployed in forty-nine stations; thirty of these were in the northern region. Often the CIVPOL were housed near or with the UNTAG district and regional centers, and shared some equipment with the military division.

Given the novelty of their task, the quick expansion of the CIVPOL force, and the diverse cultures represented in it, it is not surprising that there were problems. For example, approximately one-third of CIVPOL did not have driving skills and some officers did not speak languages compatible with each other, or with the local population. That said, the working language was Dutch, since many CIVPOL members were from the Netherlands. Afrikaans and Dutch are fairly mutually intelligible, which allowed SWAPOL and CIVPOL at least a minimum level of communication.<sup>25</sup>

Aside from these difficulties, and problems with the SWAPOL regular police, CIVPOL also experienced significant resistance from the Koevoet. The only two Security Council resolutions passed during the UNTAG operation related directly to efforts to stem Koevoet "counter-insurgency" activity.<sup>26</sup> Rather than incarcerating ex-Koevoet, which might have led to their re-organization, Ahtisaari created a combined CIVPOL and military Task Force which was successful in simply disbanding the group.

Ahtisaari and Police Advisor Fanning also created several new policing divisions in line with various needs on the ground. For example, they devised police training programs for the new Namibian police force that lasted beyond UNTAG's mandate. Thus UN civilian policing as we know it today was born. Overall, in less than two years,



UNTAG helped to change society's relation to the police: Namibians no longer feared their police.

## Refugees

Repatriation, resettlement, and reconstruction in Namibia were overseen by the UNHCR as an integral part of UNTAG's civilian operations working closely with the Namibian Council of Churches. UNHCR's mandate came from the 1978 Settlement Plan, which granted all Namibian refugees voluntary, peaceful return, with full amnesty, through suitable entry points in time for participation in the elections. The UNHCR went to great lengths to obtain agreements in the form of signed protocols between the UNHCR, SWAPO, Angola, and Zambia. Working on a strict timetable, the refugee resettlement process was unprecedented for its smooth and effective organization.<sup>27</sup>

## Elections and adoption of the constitution

Holding elections was the central purpose and primary goal of UNTAG. Creating the conditions for, and managing, the elections were arguably the UN's most important contribution to the process of implementing peace in Namibia. Once UNTAG elections offices had been established in over 200 locations, police monitoring mechanisms in place, refugees resettled, and military demobilization underway, the procedures for the elections unfolded with only a few moments of difficulty, and according to a strict timetable.

In the run-up to the elections, there were disputes over incidents of intimidation, harassment, and violent crimes committed by both sides, but mainly by supporters of the anti-SWAPO party, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). In response, UNTAG set up regular meetings between the parties to deal with tensions as they arose, averting them to the fullest extent possible before they escalated. In order to institutionalize this approach, an innovative "Code of Conduct" was signed between nine of the ten competing parties. Once the code had been distributed, UNTAG offices would receive complaints of abuses of the code, and report them to its policing divisions or a new Commission for the Prevention and Combating of Intimidation and Electoral Malpractice.

Despite the overall reduction in violence, there was one serious attempt at derailing the electoral process. On 1 November 1989, one week before the elections, South African Foreign Minister Roelof Frederik "Pik" Botha held a press conference announcing falsely that SWAPO forces had again amassed on the Angolan side of the border, and were preparing to invade Namibia. CIVPOL, along with the UNTAG military, and district and regional centers, quickly determined that the reports were false, and widely publicized South Africa's duplicity. Unlike the similar-sounding



alarm of 1 April 1989, this time, UNTAG had information mechanisms in place to establish the veracity of the reports, and pre-empt a possible armed clash through diplomatic means.

The vote took place from 7 to 11 November 1989. UNTAG staff were at a 4:5 ratio with South African-sponsored counterparts at most polling stations, including at least one UNTAG military ballot box supervisor, and two CIVPOL members per polling station. With 97 percent voter turnout, of the seventy-two seats in the Constituent Assembly, SWAPO won forty-one and the DTA twenty-one. The remaining ten seats were divided among five smaller parties. Given that the adoption of a constitution required a two-thirds majority, SWAPO and the DTA would either have to cooperate with each other, or abandon the constitutional process. SWAPO immediately documented its primary ideas, and surprisingly, the DTA accepted the SWAPO proposal as the working draft Constitution. The 9 February 1990 Constitution was not only formulated, but also adopted by consensus. Namibia's first Prime Minister explains the importance of this consensual process:

Our Constitution is the product of serious internal political negotiations. We debated every aspect until we reached a consensus ... we never had to vote on a single issue even though we were a collection of political parties from across the spectrum—a racist party at one extreme and SWAPO at the other. ... Our constitution is at once our victory, our shield, and our guide for the future.<sup>28</sup>

Despite continuing problems of unequal land distribution, the constitution was a negotiated document, founded in an atmosphere of "give and take," which set the tone for the future political culture of Namibia. In the years since the end of the UN's transitional administration, Namibia has remained at peace. There is no ongoing widespread military confrontation, nor is the level of crime or private violence high.

## CONCLUSION

UNTAG had a centrally-organized command structure, although its offices were widely distributed throughout the territory of Namibia. Ahtisaari's leadership allowed for creativity and flexibility on the part of staff in seeking contact with Namibians. The mission faced several crises, including the 1 April 1989 debacle, and the South African challenge on 1 November 1989, but these crises were adequately defused.

Many of the innovative strategies devised in the Namibian context—such as the creation of a new domestic police force, the information program, regional and district centers, and the electoral code of conduct—would later be replicated in other parts of the world. The mission sought to implement its mandate through the legitimate means of dialogue, compromise, and persuasion, which set the tone for ongoing political processes in Namibia. While UNTAG's year-long stay did not drastically alter the economic



standing of most Namibians, it did tip the balance toward the consolidation of peace, and the structures and principles of democratic rule.

One central lesson that may be extrapolated from this first successful case of multidimensional peacekeeping is that ending wars is as much a political as a military endeavor. UNTAG had nearly equal numbers of military and civilian staff, and the operation's leadership was intensely concerned with establishing "legitimacy" and "authenticity." Most importantly, its leaders sought to create a reputation of "objectivity and integrity" by having UNTAG staff interact frequently, directly, and in person, with ordinary Namibians. UNTAG was not burdened by the macro-level "peacebuilding culture" that has characterized many peacekeeping missions,<sup>29</sup> preventing them from integrating local perspectives, and using dialogue and institutional innovation rather than force as a means of promoting peace. On the contrary, the UNTAG leadership gave great latitude to dozens of small regional and district offices, and actively sought staff input as to how the operation might adapt to its environment, and improve its functioning over time.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This chapter is adapted in part from Lise Howard, "UN Peace Implementation in Namibia: The Causes of Success," *International Peacekeeping* 9, no. 1 (2002).

## NOTES

1. See Faye Carroll, *South West Africa and the United Nations* (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1967).
2. UN General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/31/146, 20 December 1976.
3. See Sam Nujoma, *Where Others Wavered* (Bedford, UK: Panaf Books, 2001); and Nelson Mandela, *In His Own Words* (New York: Little Brown, 2004).
4. The "Western Contact Group" was set up in 1977 to aid in the negotiations. Its members were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada.
5. The front-line states included Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria.
6. S/12636, 10 April 1978, para. 5.
7. Ahtisaari had held various diplomatic posts in Africa, and became the UN Under-Secretary-General for Administration before serving as UNTAG Special Representative, and later, President of Finland. He won the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize.
8. S/20566, 4 April 1989; and S/20346, 22 December 1988.
9. A separate division was the office of the "Independent Jurist," who fulfilled a mandate to oversee the release of political prisoners and detainees and the repeal of discriminatory legislation, and offered legal advice to the Special Representative when needed.
10. Martti Ahtisaari, President of Finland, interviews with the author, Presidential Summer Residence, Kultaranta, Finland, 10, 11, 12 July 1998; and Cedric Thornberry, *A Nation Is Born: The Inside Story of Namibia's Independence* (Windhoek, Namibia: Gamsberg Macmillan Publishers, 2004), 111.



11. Unpublished UN Report, 14, para. 30.
12. Ibid., 6, para. 12.
13. Ibid., 6, para. 13.
14. According to Louise Olsson, "many women in the civilian UNTAG staff took it upon themselves to adapt their work to meet the local needs of both women and men." Olsson, "Gender Mainstreaming in Practice: The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group in Namibia," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 2 (2001), 97.
15. Ahtisaari in Heribert Weiland and Matthew Braham (eds.), *The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and Lessons for the Future* (Freiburg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Weiland, 1994) 67; and Thornberry, *A Nation Is Born*, 376.
16. Unpublished UN Report, 36-37, paras 75-77.
17. Ingrid A. Lehmann, *Peacekeeping and Public Information: Caught in the Crossfire* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 28-50.
18. Approximately 90 percent of Namibians are Christian, and many attend church regularly.
19. Unpublished UN Report, 34, para. 70.
20. Four subsidiary tasks included: transferring SADF civilian functions (in communications, schools, and hospitals) to UNTAG, and then to the new Namibian government; providing communications, security, and logistics for the UNTAG civilian and military components; monitoring borders; and ensuring the security of returning refugees and exiles.
21. Prem Chand (former Force Commander of UNTAG) in Weiland and Braham (eds.), *The Namibian Peace Process*, 93.
22. S/12636, 10 April 1978, para. 9.
23. Steven Fanning, in Weiland and Braham (eds.), *The Namibian Peace Process*, 104.
24. Fanning, *The Namibian Peace Process*, para. 142.
25. English was also widely spoken within UNTAG, and it is the national language of Namibia.
26. Security Council Resolutions 640 and 643 of 1989.
27. Unpublished UN Report, 99.
28. Theo-Ben Gurirab, Prime Minister of Namibia, in Weiland and Braham (eds.), *The Namibian Peace Process*, 171-172.
29. Severine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).