CHAPTER 27

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR (ONUSAL)

LISE M. HOWARD

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established in May 1991, in the midst of fighting during the Salvadoran civil war, where there was "no peace to keep." The UN was invited by both sides of the conflict—the Salvadoran government and the opposition, the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN)—to monitor, under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the human rights conditions in the country. In January 1992, the warring sides signed the Chapultepec Peace Accord, and ONUSAL expanded to an "active verification" mission, with civilian police, military, and eventually election monitoring divisions (but without changing its name or acronym). The mission was successful despite having started before there was a peace agreement to implement. Specialists on Central America have argued that, as of the mid-1990s, "of the UN's internal peacemaking efforts since the end of the Cold War, its work in El Salvador stands out as the most unambiguously successful."1

The war in El Salvador was one of the twentieth century's longest-running civil conflicts in Latin America.2 Fought over ideology and economic inequality, it extended over twelve years, took the lives of approximately 75,000 people, and created well over one million refugees and internally displaced persons.3

Supported by Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the FMLN sought to destabilize the Salvadoran government through a campaign of attacks on government officials as well as on the Salvadoran physical infrastructure. For its part, the Salvadoran government and various paramilitary organizations sought to frighten people away from supporting the FMLN through public assassinations and broad-sweeping military campaigns. While the Christian Democrats nominally ruled the country for most of the 1980s, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces, along with the death squads associated with the rightist party
Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), waged brutal warfare. These groups were supported financially, and sometimes were trained by, the United States government.\(^4\)

With the winding down of the Cold War, in September and October of 1989, the FMLN and the government held their first talks aimed at working toward a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict. However, shortly after the talks, an explosion in a Union Hall during a meeting killed several people, including a prominent leader of the national trade union. In response, the FMLN waged a renewed all-out offensive that brought the fighting directly to the capital, San Salvador. Apparently in counter-response, on 16 November 1989, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter, were assassinated.\(^5\) The Jesuit murders sparked international outrage against the anti-FMLN militias, especially from within the US Congress, as charges were made that the group responsible had originally been trained by US personnel. The US subsequently stopped its funding for the Salvadoran government and gave its political support to ONUSAL. Meanwhile, the FMLN offensive continued, and although it did not overthrow the government, it demonstrated that the FMLN could not be defeated militarily. Neither side could win. While the parties remained far apart in their concerns, they agreed to talks facilitated by a “credible third party”—the United Nations.\(^6\) They requested the assistance of the UN Secretary-General, and welcomed mediation by his Personal Representative, the Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto.\(^7\)

**MANDATE AND KEY FACTS**

*Operation Mandate:* San José Agreement, 16 August 1990 (A/44/971-S/21541). Parties requested the UN to monitor human rights; collect information by “any means” deemed appropriate; use media “to the extent useful” after the ceasefire.

UN Security Council resolution 693, 20 May 1991, resolved to commence ONUSAL human rights monitoring before the start of a ceasefire.

UN Security Council resolution 759, 14 January 1992, enlarged the ONUSAL mandate to include military and police divisions and the verification and monitoring of the implementation of “all the agreements once these are signed.”

Chapultepec Accord signed in Mexico, 30 January 1992 (A/46/864-S/23501). Parties agreed to a ceasefire and to add civilian policing and military divisions to the ONUSAL mission.

October 1992, letters to Secretary-General from the Salvadoran government and the FMLN established UN oversight of the Land Transfer Program (not issued as formal UN documents).\(^8\)

UN Security Council resolution 832, 27 May 1993, enlarged ONUSAL's mandate to include observation of the electoral process.

**Duration:** July 1991—April 1995

**Personnel:** Military: 368 officers, 80 percent from Spain. Other troop contributors included Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Ireland, Sweden, and Venezuela. Police: 315 officers from Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, France, Guyana, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and Sweden. Other civilian: 140 international, 180 local. Election observers: 900 international.

**Finance:** US$107.7 million
Course of the Operation

ONUSAL went through three distinct phases of operation. It began as a small human rights monitoring group in July 1991 with just over one hundred members, expanding in February 1992 to include Police and Military Divisions totaling over 800 international and local staff. Finally, it added an Electoral Division, from late 1993 to April 1994, augmenting the total staff with another 900 short-term electoral observers.9

The January 1992 Chapultepec Accord gave greater detail to many of the provisions set out in the eight previous accords, including, most significantly, an ambitious and detailed timetable with over one hundred deadlines for demobilization, weapons collection, reintegration of former combatants, police reforms, and other related issues.

The primary tasks in ONUSAL’s operations included human rights monitoring, civilian policing, military demobilization and reintegration, land reform, and finally, elections monitoring.

Human rights

ONUSAL originated as a human rights monitoring mission, its mandate stemming from the July 1990 San José Agreement. Both parties charged the UN with the power to “verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador.”10 The San José Agreement also stipulated that the UN would “take up its duties as of the cessation of the armed conflict.” This agreement was intended, therefore, to assist in restructuring the post-war state (rather than dealing with crimes of the past). However, both parties requested earlier UN deployment, in the middle of the peace negotiations, even as both were continuing to renege on, and thus undermine, the peace agreement. In other words, both parties were “spoilers” of the peace accords while claiming to be willing to end the war.

Given this appearance of willingness, the UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar sent an initial exploratory group, which found “the existence of a widespread desire in all sectors of opinion in El Salvador that the UN should commence the verification of the Agreement as soon as possible, without awaiting a ceasefire.”11 Upon the Secretary-General’s repeated suggestion to the Security Council of early deployment, the Council eventually voted unanimously in favor.12

ONUSAL began preparations in El Salvador for its human rights monitoring mission on 26 July 1991 and by 1 October, it was established in four regional and two sub-regional offices. The staff was comprised of 101 international civil servants from twenty-seven countries, “including human rights observers and advisers, legal advisers, educators, political affairs officers, military advisers, police advisers, administrative support, and communications personnel.”13
Within the first few months of ONUSAL's establishment in El Salvador, the mission and other human rights groups observed "clear signs of a significant decline" in human rights abuses related to the armed conflict. These abuses declined even further after the formalization of the January 1992 Chapultepec Accord. By 1993–94, the human rights division would expand its activities beyond its original mandate in response to ad hoc requests to mediate land disputes, observe demonstrations, and participate in police training activities. It also formalized its methods for reporting on human rights abuses, coming to be called "active verification." By all accounts, even though this result was not expressly written into the mandate of this division, the Human Rights division contributed to bringing about marked declines in human rights abuses.

Civilian police

The civilian police, or CIVPOL division of ONUSAL experienced resistance to its development from the outset. CIVPOL faced obstacles from international donors, from other parts of ONUSAL, from the local policing forces, and from the Salvadoran government. Nevertheless, CIVPOL did manage to fulfill its mandate, and even accomplish tasks beyond its duties as laid out in the peace accord.

The Chapultepec Accord included dozens of specific institutional changes that were to be made in policing, in order to convert repressive police and internal security forces into a single modern force, practicing principles of professional, apolitical, community- and rights-based policing. The new police force, called the National Civilian Police, was to break tradition by being categorically separate from the military. ONUSAL's CIVPOL was mandated to assist in the selection of candidates for, and the creation of, a new police training academy (the Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública). It was also tasked with "ensuring a smooth transition" and sending a group of specialists "to accompany officers and members of the National Police in the performance of their duties." Interpretation of the mandate would also eventually include on-the-job training for the fledgling National Civilian Police, as well as actual policing in the FMLN dominated ex-war zones, where a severe security gap developed in the six months between the time that Chapultepec was signed and a new National Civilian Police created.

Despite large ambitions on the part of the UN in general and the CIVPOL division leadership in particular, civilian policing was not one of the favorite projects for donors, and only 314 of a mandated 631 officers were ever deployed. However, those who did eventually arrive were reputed to have adequate language skills, good equipment, and standard professional qualifications, which helped to overcome some obstacles the force was to face.

The main obstruction came from the Salvadoran government and its policing forces. In the accords the three main Salvadoran police forces—the National Police, the National Guard, and the Treasury Police—were to be replaced by one National Civilian Police. The last two were to be abolished while the first was to be phased out more gradually, operating under UN monitoring, until the new National Civilian Police could be
trained and established throughout the country. At every step, the Salvadoran government created impediments to these major institutional transformations. Disputes between the UN and the Salvadoran parties were often resolved by the intervention of de Soto from UN headquarters. With the assistance of the UN, and bilateral aid from Spain and the United States, within two years (by 1994), adequate numbers of officers had been trained to make the National Civilian Police viable.

In sum, CIVPOL, even with drastically reduced numbers than originally envisioned, managed to accomplish its tasks as set forth in the peace accords. Similar to other divisions, members of CIVPOL interpreted the mandate broadly, seeking not only to verify implementation of the accords, but also to assist more directly in institution-building. While CIVPOL has been criticized in hindsight for not recognizing and tackling the question of crime earlier in the peace process, even critics maintain that the current force is superior to the wartime police forces.  

Armed forces reform and FMLN reintegration

By many accounts, ONUSAL's military division was one of the most successful aspects of the mission. Militarization was seen as one of the root causes of the conflict, therefore much of ONUSAL's attention was devoted to discontinuing both the military's, and the FMLN's, armed hold over the country.

ONUSAL's military division was responsible for the following tasks: monitoring the ceasefire; supervising the separation of forces and troop quartering; weapons collection at specified sites and investigations of any violations of this provision; exercising control over troop movement; verification of all supplies moving in and out of bases; concentration of all FMLN arms, munitions, mines, and other military equipment; destruction of all FMLN weapons; and mine field clearance. The Chief Military Observer of ONUSAL was to be the Chairman of a "Joint Working Group," made up of one representative from each of the parties, which was to "facilitate application" of the agreement. The Chapultepec Accord also included a detailed annex of the bases where all forces were to be concentrated, and dates by which concentration and demobilization should be completed.

Spain played a major role in the military division. While the division included troops from ten different countries, approximately 80 percent of the force, as well as the Chief Military Observer, were from Spain. This large Spanish presence, while unsettling for some Latin Americans who likened it to a neo-colonial force, worked to offset the perception among the Armed Forces that the UN mission was biased in favor of the FMLN. During the demobilization process, both sides would often stall, accusing the other of reneging on commitments made in the peace accords. The perceived neutrality of the military division, not to mention its wide disbursement throughout the country and language facility, worked to defuse many of these disputes.

By the start date of the ceasefire on 1 February 1992, the military division was at its maximum strength of 368. Members of the division were quickly distributed
throughout the country to monitor troop activity, maintaining the wide distribution until a little less than one year later, when the demobilization process was completed. UN military offices were co-located with the human rights offices, facilitating coordination between the two divisions and making any digressions easier to detect, investigate, and thwart. In all, while there were some delays in demobilization, and neither side was keen to demilitarize, the ceasefire was never broken. This was attributed to the widespread presence of ONUSAL monitors, especially in the tensest former combat areas and the sixteen “friction” zones. When crises or delays arose, the mission engaged at the appropriate level to overcome the obstacles—headquarters often exerted pressure on higher-level Salvadoran officials, while regional coordinators focused on local-level officials. Such flexibility and learning allowed the mission to succeed in implementing its mandate despite low numbers of UN troops.

Land transfer program

After troop demobilization, the reintegration of ex-combatants into society was seen as a key element in the transition to the consolidation of peace. The Chapultepec Accord sought to specify the means of reintegration through a National Reconstruction Plan, which included infrastructure development, re-training and short-term salaries for combatants, and most significantly, a land transfer program. National reconstruction and land transfers were to be implemented by the government, funded primarily by international donors, and verified by a defunct Peace Consolidation Commission. ONUSAL was not mentioned in this section of the accord, and the land transfer program was not as meticulously mediated or drafted as most of the rest of the document, leading to serious disputes between the government and the FMLN about its implementation.

Land, mainly in former combat zones, had been occupied by “landholders” during the war, many of whom were sympathetic to the FMLN. The “landowners,” on the other hand, were generally government supporters. Under the land transfer program, the government agreed to buy occupied land from willing landowners, and to provide credits to the landholders to purchase the land on which they had been living.

By the fall of 1992, the land transfer program, dubbed “the land for arms” deal, had come to a halt. The government had not begun the land program as stipulated in the accords, and the FMLN retaliated by refusing to go forward with troop demobilization. It took the intervention of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to propose compromises for both sides, including UN oversight of the implementation of the new agreement. Thereafter, members of ONUSAL stepped in to mediate numerous other land-related disputes. Despite serious delays, land was successfully transferred to 98.9 percent of the beneficiaries by the end of 1996. This amounted to only approximately 10 percent of the country’s farming land, but it did provide a source of employment for many former combatants.

ONUSAL was not originally mandated to assist in the land transfer program. However, as it became clear that this program was an extremely important element in
the implementation of the peace accords, ONUSAL became more involved, interpreting the mandate broadly to include, eventually, "active verification" and fairly successful implementation of the program.

**Elections**

Progress in the many areas in which ONUSAL was working set the stage for the elections, even though elections monitoring was not originally one of the major components of its mandate. As happens only every fifteen years in El Salvador, in March 1994, elections were to be held simultaneously for the Presidency and for the Assembly, as well as for the 262 Mayoralities and twenty Deputies to the Central American Parliament. In January 1993, the Salvadoran Government formally requested that the UN verify these elections. At the urging of the Secretary-General, the Security Council agreed to the expansion of ONUSAL to include a fourth, major division for elections.25

The mandate stipulated that the UN simply "observe and verify" the process before, during, and after the elections. However, ONUSAL's leadership knew that the central obstacles to the elections were an incomplete and inaccurate voter list, a lack of voter registration cards for approximately one-third of the potential voters (an estimated 786,000 people), and continuing disagreements between the political parties.26 They thus interpreted the mandate to include logistical and technical support for the fault-ridden voter registration process, and active mediation between the parties, even though these are not mentioned in the official mandate.27

ONUSAL's task was enormous, especially given that it had constantly to battle with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal—a state organ that was only nominally independent from the ruling ARENA party. In addition, ONUSAL's difficult mission was made more so by the fact that the head of the division did not assume his post until September 1993, almost four months after the division had already begun its work.28 Moreover the division had a staff of a mere thirty-six people deployed throughout the six regional offices (expanded by 900 in the days just before and after the elections; there were also some 3,000 other international observers on election day).

The overall plan leading up to the elections involved two important steps: a massive attempt at registering people in time to vote; and cajoling parties to behave well. In terms of registering, the process set up by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was time-consuming, bureaucratic, and costly. As the elections approached, hundreds of thousands of people, especially in the former war zones, remained unregistered. But ONUSAL invented mechanisms to respond to the difficulties such as day-long registration drives, or *mega-journada* to register voters quickly and free of charge. While for some months it looked as though the entire election process would be delegitimized by the low numbers of people registered to vote, in the end, the electoral division managed to "verify" the registration of 2.3 million people, or some 85 percent of potential voters.29

In terms of monitoring the campaigns, while there were some problems of state interference with the media, hundreds of political rallies and meetings were held during the
campaign period with few instances of intimidation or violence. Special Representative Ramirez-Ocampo persuaded six of the seven presidential candidates to sign a code of conduct to refrain from intimidation, violence, and overly negative campaigning, and to respect the election results and implement the peace accord. In the end, the campaign was so calm that some commented that the elections were even “unremarkable,” and “rather boring.”

After a run-off election, ARENA’s Calderón Sol won the presidency with a landslide 68 percent of the vote. Given some irregularities and an unusually low voter-turnout when compared to the numbers of people registered, ONUSAL declared the elections “acceptable.” Experts have argued that “ONUSAL’s Electoral Division saved the elections from certain disaster.”

The elections helped to consolidate democratic practices in El Salvador. Poll workers were trained in the technicalities of holding elections; civil society organizations learned how to monitor elections, which proved decisive in subsequent elections; and most Salvadoran citizens of voting age obtained voting registration cards. There were also two crucial political changes that emerged from these elections: the army and police learned how to provide professional security for campaigns and elections, and the FMLN transformed itself from a guerrilla force into a full-fledged political party, seeking gain through political rather than violent means.

CONCLUSION

ONUSAL deployed initially as a human rights monitoring mission in May 1991, despite the fact that both sides continued to fight for almost another year. The UN Secretary-General’s personal representative, Alvaro de Soto, functioned as mediator both before the eventual ceasefire, and during the life of the peacekeeping operation. Alongside UN mediation, each of ONUSAL’s divisions—human rights, police, military, (land reform), and electoral—fulfilled the mandates as set forth in the peace accords and in subsequent agreements.

The 1992 Chapultepec Accord granted the UN power to verify implementation of the agreements in non-binding terms. In other words, the UN could make recommendations and offer technical support to authorities. But many analysts and practitioners argue that, “The UN pushed that mandate to the limit … [even though] at the time of the negotiations it was not expected to play an activist role beyond verification.”

By mid-1993, the UN came to describe its method as “active verification,” that is, it exerted pressure on Salvadoran political elites by making “concrete and specific recommendations to be implemented by the parties.” “We were able to exert pressure,” de Soto explained, “through shame, cajoling, and persuasion. We got very far using these tactics—especially when you compare the mandate of this mission with the more robust mandates of other missions.”
The UN mission in El Salvador had a different organizational structure from other operations in that the key figure pressing the parties to comply with the peace accords was not the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, but rather, the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative, Alvaro de Soto. The position of Chief of Mission, often also called Special Representative of the Secretary-General, changed hands three times throughout the course of ONUSAL. In other words, unlike other peacekeeping missions, the Special Representative was not the top UN representative in El Salvador.

The UN began its ground operation before the declaration of the ceasefire. This does not mean that ONUSAL was trying to enforce or coerce the end of the conflict, but that members of the Secretariat, especially de Soto, were using diplomatic maneuvers to mediate an end to the conflict. Beginning in 1989, de Soto was a direct signatory to many of the eight attempted peace accords, and over time, gained legitimacy with all sides as the most authoritative UN figure in the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes. Mediation efforts were supposed to end with the signing of the final Chapultepec Accord in January 1992, but in fact it continued until the end of the UN operations in 1996.

The mission benefited from geographic, linguistic, and social advantages. El Salvador is close to New York geographically and Secretary-General Perez de Cuéllar and de Soto were both Spanish speakers from Latin America, and shared some common cultural understandings. El Salvador also had a reasonably high, 71 percent literacy rate, and had been relatively prosperous compared to other countries in Central America. Many observers both in and outside the UN system agreed that the more exclusive and abusive institutions of the state needed to be changed. These factors worked to free the UN operation to focus on altering personnel and institutions at the elite level.

Overall, the UN operation undoubtedly augmented the country’s prospects for peace. The peace process has not been seriously challenged since the official close of the follow-on UN missions in June 1997, and since the end of the war, a “passion for peace seems to have replaced passion for revolution.” The root cause of the conflict was seen to be the military’s influence over politics and society. This influence was virtually eliminated after implementation of the peace agreements, with the purging of the top command, the downsizing of the armed forces, and the restructuring of the forces away from internal security and toward national defense. The ceasefire has not been broken, nor are there fears that this might happen, given that the FMLN and all major parties have forsworn political or economic gain through violent means.

Political violence is no longer a subject of great concern, but criminal violence has been. The growth of violent gangs arose in part as a legacy of the vicious civil war, but gang violence is now waning. One analyst summarizes, “Although the successes of the peace accords were due first to the commitment of many Salvadorans, it is inconceivable that the peace process could have advanced as far as it did without ONUSAL.” ONUSAL thus ranks alongside the UN missions in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone as having successfully implemented its peacekeeping mandate.
The ONUSAL mission presents several important peacekeeping lessons. First, Chapter VI operations can be successful even if deployed before the conclusion of a ceasefire. With deft political leadership, such operations may establish peace through the means of persuasion, cajoling, shaming, and socialization, and do not always need to resort to more coercive, Chapter VII means. Second, the SRSG does not necessarily have to be the top political leader in a peacekeeping operation. It is important for successful operations to be led by someone who is perceived to have moral authority and local and international legitimacy. Third, inadequate funding for police operations and a small military component do not necessarily spell the demise of peacekeeping missions in rough neighborhoods. Fourth, adaptability and organizational learning have a greater chance of future success than simply applying "lessons" derived from one context and applying them to another. Finally, "mission creep" does not necessarily lead to mission failure. ONUSAL's mandate expanded numerous times, which led to the eventual success of the mission.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This chapter is adapted from Lise Howard, "El Salvador: centrally-propelled learning," *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

NOTES


15. ONUSAL also supported the work of two other human rights-oriented institutions—the Ad Hoc Commission, comprised of three prominent Salvadorans, and the Truth Commission, comprised of three international commissioners. Whereas ONUSAL focused on monitoring human rights abuses as they occurred, the other human rights entities were established to report on human rights abuses of the past. The commissions recommended the discharge or transfer of over 100 officers, and named the people responsible for many of the worst episodes of the war such as the 1981 massacre in El Mozote.


21. *Blue Helmets*, 443. About half of the troops were simply transferred from the recently ended mission next door in Nicaragua.


23. Letters were issued between all sides to make these agreements, but they were not issued as formal UN documents. See *The United Nations and El Salvador*, 257–264.


27. The expansion of activities was post facto approved by the Security Council in S/RES/888, 30 November 1993.


39. Murder rates were rising steadily until the “gang truce” in the spring of 2012, after which they dropped significantly.